Routes and overlaps

Background

1. The objective of this appendix is to consider the public transport routes operated by NEG in and around the Greater Anglia franchise area, in order to identify the instances where newly-acquired rail routes 'overlap' with NEG's existing coach and rail routes. Overlapping routes may previously have competed with one another; hence it is important to analyse the overlapping routes in order to determine whether NEG's acquisition of the Greater Anglia rail franchise has resulted in a substantial lessening of competition.

2. The Greater Anglia rail franchise is shown in Figure 1. It is made up of a number of constituent parts:

   - West Anglia (formerly part of the WAGN franchise).
   - Stansted Express (formerly part of the WAGN franchise).
   - Anglia Intercity and Anglia Local.
   - Great Eastern.

   NEG previously operated the West Anglia and Stansted Express services; hence the newly-acquired routes are those which comprise the Anglia Intercity, Anglia Local and Great Eastern parts of the Greater Anglia rail franchise, as shown in Figure 2.[1]

3. There are two key types of overlaps that may arise as a result of NEG's acquisition of these routes:

   - overlaps between the newly acquired rail routes and NEG's National Express coach routes; and
   - overlaps between the newly acquired rail routes and those rail routes that operate as part of neighbouring rail franchises operating by NEG.

   We shall consider each of these types of overlaps in turn.

[1]Source: 'One' web site, http://217.169.39.230/downloads/welcome_to_one.pdf. Note that these diagrams are presented for illustrative purposes only; they are not necessarily accurate representations of the physical network.

FIGURE 1

The Greater Anglia Rail franchise



Source: NEG.

FIGURE 2

The newly-acquired routes



Source: NEG.

Coach vs rail overlaps

4. NEG operates a total of 19 coach services within or through the Greater Anglia rail franchise area. Of these 19 services, ten overlap at least partially with newly-acquired rail routes:

- 305 Southend-on-Sea–Liverpool
- 308 Great Yarmouth–Birmingham
- 350 Liverpool–Clacton-on-Sea
- 481 Felixstowe–London
- 484 Walton-on-the-Naze–London
- 490 Great Yarmouth–London
- 495 Cromer–London
- 496 Cromer–London
- 497 Great Yarmouth–London
- 727 Norwich–Gatwick

On these ten routes, NEG has identified 71 passenger flows where coach services overlap with newly-acquired rail routes. 64 of these overlaps are between coach services and direct rail services, whilst a further seven overlaps were identified between coach services and indirect train services (ie those requiring a change of trains). 16 flows had zero annual revenues in the year ending 31 December 2003, whilst a number of other flows generated very small amounts of revenue.

5. In their response to the CC's questions, NEG originally defined flows as being 'direct connections' between two points on a route.[2] Following inquiries from the CC, this definition was widened to consider flows where a change of trains is required in order to complete a journey. This issue is discussed in further detail below.

Precedents—Central Trains and First Group

6. The 1997 Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) inquiry into NEG's acquisition of the Central Trains franchise considered the issue of overlaps between rail and coach routes. In that case, over 40 separate overlapping flows were identified. However, the MMC focused its attention on 12 flows, according to the following criteria:

- only those flows where NEL operated three or more services in summer were considered; and
- only those flows generating annual revenue of more than £20,000 were considered.

7. No explanation of the chosen criteria was given in the MMC's report, other than an intention to identify those flows where the overlap was 'significant'. Whilst this previous methodology does provide an interesting input to the analysis of the overlap flows in the Greater Anglia franchise area, it is not a binding precedent and should not be considered as such.

8. In the recent CC inquiry into the merger between First Group and Scotrail, the CC considered all overlaps between bus and rail despite the fact that some rail routes were not direct, ie they required a change on the rail route.

9. The CC inquiry into First Group and Scotrail also considered the relative importance of overlap flows in comparison to the end-to-end routes of which they form a part. Routes were identified as raising potential concerns where the revenue generated on the overlapping flows accounted for 10 per cent or more of the total route revenue. Other routes were also identified as potential problems where, despite current overlap flows generating a more limited percentage of total route revenue, it could be profitable for FirstGroup to reconfigure services.

OFT assessment of routes and overlaps

10. In making its reference to the CC, the OFT considered the extent of overlaps between coach and rail routes in the Greater Anglia franchise area. The OFT's decision states the following (paragraph 8): 'There are 52 coach routes on which there is an overlap between the franchise rail routes and NEG's coach services. Of

[2] NEG stated that they chose this methodology as it was the methodology adopted in the OFT analysis.

these by far the largest are the Norwich-London and Lowestoft-London routes.[3] The OFT did not focus its analysis on a narrower range of the most relevant routes. Rather, it concentrated its efforts on analysing all of the overlap routes identified, considering 'how fares and journey times compare across these overlaps to see whether there is evidence that rail and coach might influence one another'.[4]

Identifying key overlaps

11. As discussed above, NEG identified 71 overlaps between coach services and newly-acquired rail services in the Greater Anglia franchise area. However, for the purposes of our analysis, it would seem sensible to consider whether we should focus our attention on those flows where the potential for a substantial lessening of competition is greatest. In the following paragraphs, we consider a number of factors that may help us in focusing our analysis in this way.

Most significant overlaps: revenue and passenger data

12. Examination of the data submitted by NEG relating to the 71 overlaps suggests that there are a small number of key overlap flows that account for the vast majority of the relevant revenue. Table 1 shows the relevant revenue and passenger figures for the 20 coach flows that are individually worth more than £10,000 a year, along with the corresponding data for the overlapping rail flows.[5] Table 2 shows the cumulative percentage of coach revenues from the 71 overlap flows that these 20 flows accounted for in the year ending 31 December 2003. Note that these 20 overlapping flows all derive from eight coach routes operated by NEG; the 350, 481, 484, 490, 495, 496, 497 and 727 services.

[3] The data provided to the CC by NEG identifies 71 overlap flows rather than 52. In addition, the Lowestoft to London flow, whilst significant, is less important than flows such as Ipswich to London and Colchester to London, both in terms of passenger numbers and in terms of annual revenue.
[4] OFT decision, paragraph 23.
[5] Note that all data is for both directions on each flow, except for the train revenue and passenger data on the Norwich–Stratford flow; this train service only stops at Stratford on the journey towards London, and only for setting down passengers (not picking up). Also note that coach data is for the year ending 31 December 2003, whilst train data is for the year ending 31 March 2004.

TABLE 1 **Overlaps: coach flows worth over £10,000**

	Route	*Start of flow*	*End of flow*	*Coach revenue*	*Coach passengers*	*Train revenue*	*Train passengers*
1	490	Norwich	London		[✂]		
2	727	Norwich	Heathrow*				
3	727	Norwich	Gatwick*				
4	481	Ipswich	London				
5	497	London	Bury St Edmunds				
6	490/497	Yarmouth	London				
7	484	Colchester	London				
8	497	Lowestoft	London				
9	484	Clacton	London				
10	481	Chelmsford	London				
11	497	London	Newmarket*				
12	495/496	London	Cromer*				
13	490	Norwich	Stratford				
14	497	Diss	London				
15	495/496	London	Sheringham*				
16	350	Cambridge	Ipswich				
17	484	Clacton	Stratford				
18	484	Clacton	Romford				
19	481	London	Felixstowe*				
20	350	Cambridge	Colchester*				

Source: NEG.

*Coach overlaps with indirect train services.

TABLE 2 **Coach overlaps: percentage of all coach overlap revenue**

	Route	*Start of flow*	*End of flow*	*Coach revenue*	*Cumulative % of all coach revenue*
1	490	Norwich	London	[✂]	
2	727	Norwich	Heathrow*		
3	727	Norwich	Gatwick*		
4	481	Ipswich	London		
5	497	London	Bury St Edmunds		
6	490/497	Yarmouth	London		
7	484	Colchester	London		
8	497	Lowestoft	London		
9	484	Clacton	London		
10	481	Chelmsford	London		
11	497	London	Newmarket*		
12	495/496	London	Cromer*		
13	490	Norwich	Stratford		
14	497	Diss	London		
15	495/496	London	Sheringham*		
16	350	Cambridge	Ipswich		
17	484	Clacton	Stratford		
18	484	Clacton	Romford		
19	481	London	Felixstowe*		
20	350	Cambridge	Colchester*		

Source: CC calculations on data provided by NEG.

*Coach overlaps with indirect train services.

13. These 20 flows collectively account for nearly all ([✂] per cent) of all coach revenue generated on the 71 overlap flows during the year to 31 December 2003. (They also reflect a substantial majority ([✂]) per cent of rail revenues generated on the 71 overlap flows.) In terms of analysing the potential impact of NEG's acquisition of the

Greater Anglia franchise, one option would be to restrict our detailed analysis to these flows. The 51 flows that would be excluded collectively accounted for revenues of only £[✂] in the year to 31 December 2003, a very small percentage (less than [✂] per cent) of the annual coach revenue generated on all 71 overlap flows.

14. The analysis could be simplified further by considering those flows that are responsible for a very large majority ([✂] per cent) of revenue on all coach overlap flows. The top 11 flows collectively account for a very large majority ([✂] per cent) of all coach revenue generated on the 71 overlap flows during the year to 31 December 2003. Another alternative would be to adopt the £20,000 cut-off point as used in the Central Trains inquiry. This would result in an analysis of [✂] covering [✂] per cent of all coach revenue generated on the 71 overlap flows during the year to 31 December 2003.

The 'Overlap Share of Route' test

15. A further option for focusing our analysis would be to take into account the relative importance of overlap coach flows in comparison to the end-to-end coach routes of which they form a part. This approach was adopted by the CC for the analysis of overlap bus routes in the First Group/Scotrail inquiry. Table 3 shows the proportions of each of the ten coach routes identified in paragraph 5 that are accounted for by the overlap flows arising on those routes, both in terms of revenue and in terms of number of passengers.

TABLE 3 **Coach overlaps: overlaps as a proportion of routes**

Route		*Revenue (%)*	*Passengers (%)*	*Number of overlaps†*
481	Felixstowe/Ipswich – London			13
497	Great Yarmouth/ Lowestoft-London			9
484	Walton/Clacton – London			22
490	Gt. Yarmouth/Norwich – London			13
727	Norwich-Heathrow/Gatwick	✂		8
495	Cromer-London			3
496	Cromer-London			3
350	Liverpool-Clacton-on-Sea			13
308	Great Yarmouth – Birmingham			3
305	Liverpool-Southend			1

Source: CC calculations on data provided by NEG.

*[✂]
†Some overlaps are on more than one route.

16. It may also be appropriate to focus our analysis on those routes for which overlap flows account for a significant proportion of passengers and revenue. If NEG were to attempt to exploit its overlaps between coach and rail services in the Greater Anglia area, this would be likely to involve fare changes, frequency adjustments and/or route changes that would affect the whole coach route. If the share of fare revenue on a coach route attributable to overlaps was trivial, then there would be little incentive for NEG to try to take advantage of this. In reflection of this, if we adopt a threshold of 10 per cent, such that routes for which overlaps account for less than 10 per cent of passengers and revenue are excluded from the analysis (as in the First Group/Scotrail inquiry), seven coach routes (481, 484, 490, 495, 496, 497 and 727) would be identified for focused analysis in this inquiry.

The 'Profitability' test

17. Appendix I attempts to identify those routes on which it would be profitable for NEG to attempt to 'switch' passengers from coach to rail services. That appendix raises concerns about the theoretical potential for NEG to raise profits on six coach routes. These six key routes are all among those identified in the 'overlap share of route' test above as having a significant proportion of revenue attributable to overlap flows (that is, the 481, 484, 490, 495, 496 and 497 services).

The Norwich–Stratford overlap

18. There could be an argument for excluding at least part of this flow from the analysis. Train services running from London towards Norwich do not stop at Stratford, and so this overlap could be considered not to exist in that direction. Ten Norwich–London trains a day stop at Stratford on a 'setting-down only' basis. The data supplied by NEG does not separate out coach revenues according to direction of travel, and so it is difficult to determine how much the Norwich–Stratford element of this coach flow is worth. Applying a simplistic assumption of 50 per cent travelling each way would result in a flow worth less than the £10,000 threshold we have adopted. However, since Stratford train station is very close to Liverpool Street station, it is likely that passengers wishing to travel between Stratford and Norwich by train will travel from Liverpool Street, and therefore the passenger data for train journeys from London to Norwich will include passengers who would otherwise have travelled just from Stratford to Norwich. Therefore, we do not believe it is appropriate to make any adjustment to the Norwich–Stratford coach flow data.

Limited-availability direct train services

19. On a number of the overlap flows identified by NEG, there are only a very limited number of direct train services operating each day. These flows are summarized in Table 4.

TABLE 4 **Overlap flows with limited direct train services**

Start of Flow	*End of Flow*	*Number of Direct Trains*
Bury St Edmunds	London	1 per day
Lowestoft	London	1 per day
Beccles	London	1 per day
Yarmouth	Diss	1 per day
Yarmouth	London	2 per day (3 on Saturdays)
Acle	London	2 per day (3 on Saturdays)

Source: NEG data and National Rail Timetable.

Despite the fact that there are only a very limited number of direct train services in operation, the data provided by NEG relates to all passengers travelling on these flows, the vast majority of whom will have to change trains at either Ipswich (for Bury St Edmunds–London,[6] Lowestoft–London and Beccles–London) or Norwich (for

[6] The Bury St Edmunds–London train flow may also be completed by changing at Cambridge.

Yarmouth–Diss, Yarmouth–London and Acle–London).[7] There could therefore be an argument for excluding these services from the analysis, since the majority of the data does not relate to an overlapping flow (at least, not if we restrict ourselves to overlaps consisting of direct coach vs direct train services). There may also be only limited potential for NEG to attempt to divert people to the train service, since there is limited availability of a direct rail alternative.

20. In any case, there are arguments for retaining those flows with only a small number of direct train links, since:

- more direct train links are to be added between London and Lowestoft and also between London and Bury St Edmunds at the end of 2004;
- excluding the six limited-direct-train overlaps could result in the inquiry neglecting an important aspect of NEG's operations in the Greater Anglia area; and
- even where passengers have to change trains, a recommended connecting service is included in the timetable. Despite a change of train, the rail journeys still tend to be faster than the overlapping coach journeys. Furthermore, the effect of the necessity to change trains may be to make the coach and train services closer substitutes in the eyes of passengers, who will be trading off a slower, cheaper coach service against a more expensive train service that involves a change of vehicle.

21. Given the arguments above, we believe that limited-direct-service overlaps should be included in the analysis.

Indirect train services

22. NEG has also provided the CC with data relating to seven key flows where coach journeys overlap with *indirect* rail journeys (ie those involving a change of trains), with a view to assessing how important these indirect overlaps are. The indirect overlap flows for which NEG has provided data are shown in Table 5.

TABLE 5 **Overlaps with indirect rail services**

Start of Flow	*End of Flow*
Norwich	Heathrow
Norwich	Gatwick
London	Newmarket
London	Cromer
London	Sheringham
London	Felixstowe
Cambridge	Colchester

Source: NEG data.

23. As stated in the discussion of limited-direct-service overlaps above, even with a change of train, rail journeys still tend to be faster than the overlapping coach journeys. Furthermore, the effect of the necessity to change trains may be to make the coach and train services closer substitutes in the eyes of passengers, who will be trading off a slower, cheaper coach service against a more expensive train service

[7] [✂]

that involves a change of vehicle. Therefore, we believe that these indirect services should be included in the analysis.

Airport overlaps

24. NEG told us that the bulk of passengers using the Norwich to Heathrow/Gatwick coach service were in fact travelling between the London airports themselves. The overlap flows from Norwich to the two airports account for less than 20 per cent of the revenues on the service. For journeys between Norwich and the two airports, coach has some advantages compared with rail, particularly in terms of avoiding the necessity to change modes of transport (usually whilst carrying luggage) and the attendant uncertainty about catching connecting services. These coach services also have a higher frequency (two-hourly) than is the case with other coach routes, and journey times are more comparable with rail. In contrast to journeys into London, moreover, use of car accounts for a substantial amount of travel between East Anglia and the two airports, but with use of coach enabling passengers to save on the cost of airport car parking. We are satisfied that NEG is unlikely to put the performance of its coach service at risk by any attempt to divert passengers from coach to alternative indirect rail services between East Anglia and the airports. Therefore, we exclude these two overlap flows from our analysis.

Proposed methodology

25. Applying the criteria discussed above would result in the following selection of overlap flows for detailed analysis:

TABLE 6 **Overlaps for focused analysis**

	Route	*Start of flow*	*End of flow*
1	490	Norwich	London
2	481	Ipswich	London
3	497	London	Bury St Edmunds
4	490/497	Yarmouth	London
5	484	Colchester	London
6	497	Lowestoft	London
7	484	Clacton	London
8	481	Chelmsford	London
9	497	London	Newmarket*
10	495/496	London	Cromer*
11	490	Norwich	Stratford
12	497	Diss	London
13	495/496	London	Sheringham*
14	484	Clacton	Stratford
15	484	Clacton	Romford
16	481	London	Felixstowe*

Source: CC study.

*Coach overlaps with indirect train services.

26. These overlaps have been identified in the following way:

- Consider only those overlaps generating more than £10,000 a year in coach revenue;

- Focus on those coach routes for which the overlap flows account for more than 10 per cent of passengers and revenue on the route as a whole;

- Exclude the two airport services from the analysis.

No adjustment has been made to the Norwich–Stratford flow data, and neither have any of the limited-direct-service overlaps been excluded (other than the airport services).

Relative importance of coach and rail in the identified overlaps

27. Finally, for information, we consider the relative size of coach and train revenues and passengers on the identified overlap flows. The following tables show the shares of total revenue and passengers on each of the overlap flows accounted for by coach and train.

TABLE 7 **Overlaps: share of total revenue**

Route	*Start of flow*	*End of flow*	*Coach revenue %*	*Train revenue %*
490	Norwich	London		
481	Ipswich	London		
497	London	Bury St Edmunds		
490/497	Yarmouth	London		
484	Colchester	London		
497	Lowestoft	London		
484	Clacton	London		
481	Chelmsford	London		
497	London	Newmarket*		
495/496	London	Cromer*		
490	Norwich	Stratford		
497	Diss	London		
495/496	London	Sheringham*		
484	Clacton	Stratford		
484	Clacton	Romford		
481	London	Felixstowe*		

Source: CC study from information provided by NEG.

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*Coach overlaps with indirect train services.

TABLE 8 **Overlaps: share of total passengers**

Route	*Start of flow*	*End of flow*	*Coach Passengers %*	*Train Passengers %*
490	Norwich	London		
481	Ipswich	London		
497	London	Bury St Edmunds		
490/497	Yarmouth	London		
484	Colchester	London		
497	Lowestoft	London		
484	Clacton	London		
481	Chelmsford	London	✂	
497	London	Newmarket*		
495/496	London	Cromer*		
490	Norwich	Stratford		
497	Diss	London		
495/496	London	Sheringham*		
484	Clacton	Stratford		
484	Clacton	Romford		
481	London	Felixstowe*		

Source: CC study from information provided by NEG.

*Coach overlaps with indirect train services.

28. The share of both revenue and passengers attributable to coach ranges from less than 0.5 per cent ([✂]) to over 40 per cent ([✂]).[8]

29. In one sense, the above data could underestimate the importance of coaches, which are primarily used for leisure travel. The proportion of leisure traffic on rail is much lower than for coach—ranging from about 20 per cent (commuting) to about 60 per cent (rural). The proportion for intercity journeys is about 40 per cent (using recommendations from the Passenger Demand Forecasting Handbook (PDFH)). Taking account of only leisure travel increases the share attributable to coach. If we take the intercity proportion as an illustrative example, the shares of revenue and passengers would be estimated as shown in the following tables:

[8] [✂]

TABLE 9 **Overlaps: share of leisure revenue**

Route	*Start of flow*	*End of flow*	*Coach revenue %*	*Train revenue %*
490	Norwich	London		
481	Ipswich	London		
497	London	Bury St Edmunds		
490/497	Yarmouth	London		
484	Colchester	London		
497	Lowestoft	London		
484	Clacton	London		
481	Chelmsford	London	✄	
497	London	Newmarket*		
495/496	London	Cromer*		
490	Norwich	Stratford		
497	Diss	London		
495/496	London	Sheringham*		
484	Clacton	Stratford		
484	Clacton	Romford		
481	London	Felixstowe*		

Source: CC study of information provided by NEG.

*Coach overlaps with indirect train services.

TABLE 10 **Overlaps: share of leisure passengers**

Route	*Start of flow*	*End of flow*	*Coach passengers %*	*Train passengers %*
490	Norwich	London		
481	Ipswich	London		
497	London	Bury St Edmunds		
490/497	Yarmouth	London		
484	Colchester	London		
497	Lowestoft	London		
484	Clacton	London		
481	Chelmsford	London	✄	
497	London	Newmarket*		
495/496	London	Cromer*		
490	Norwich	Stratford		
497	Diss	London		
495/496	London	Sheringham*		
484	Clacton	Stratford		
484	Clacton	Romford		
481	London	Felixstowe*		

Source: CC study of information provided by NEG.

*Coach overlaps with indirect train services.

30. The share of both revenue and passengers attributable to coach ranges from about 0.5 per cent ([✄]) to over 60 per cent ([✄]).[9]

Rail vs rail overlaps

31. There are two key areas where overlaps may arise between rail routes served by neighbouring rail franchises:

9 [✄]

- Two rail lines running parallel to each other between London and Southend-one-Sea; one operated by c2c between Fenchurch Street and Shoeburyness, and another operating as part of the Greater Anglia franchise (the One Great Eastern service) between Liverpool Street and Southend Victoria.

- Routes between Peterborough, Cambridge and Norwich that are served by both the Greater Anglia franchise (the One Anglia Local service) and by the Central franchise.

We consider each of these potential overlaps in turn below.

Rail vs rail overlaps between London and Southend-on-Sea

OFT analysis

32. The OFT's analysis began by focusing on two key journeys: Southend Victoria to London Liverpool Street, and Southend Central to London Fenchurch Street. Evidence was examined in order to assess whether the two TOCs had been competing with each other on these two flows, with the OFT concluding that 'some degree of competition existed'.[10] Following this, the OFT widened its analysis to consider what overlaps, if any, arise between intermediate stations along the two routes. This analysis consisted mainly of analysis of fares on various routes and the distance between the two train lines. The OFT concluded that the evidence supported the 'notion that there is competition between the Great Eastern and c2c services between overlapping and intervening stations', although the OFT's decision did not specify what those intermediate overlaps may be.

Identifying significant overlaps

33. Table 11 shows the revenue in 2003 for the Southend to London route and flow.

TABLE 11 **Southend to London route and flow revenue, 2003**

	Total revenue (£m)		*Unregulated revenue (£m)*	
	Great Eastern	*c2c*	*Great Eastern*	*c2c*
All flows between Southend and London	[✂]			
Southend (Central/Victoria) to London flow				

Source: NEG.

Note: Figures exclude revenues paid to TfL and other TOCs for Travelcards, which NEG estimated might amount to a further £[✂] across the two routes (regulated and unregulated).

34. Since Experian maps provided to us by NEG suggested overlaps in catchment areas of the two lines extending over a wide area of Southend, even to Shoeburyness, we requested NEG to provide the corresponding figures for a wider Southend area including:

[10] OFT decision, paragraph 18.

- c2c: all stations between Benfleet and Shoeburyness; and
- One Great Eastern: all stations between Rayleigh and Southend Victoria.

The resulting data is summarized in Table 12. This shows the total amount of revenue for the fiscal years 2003 and 2004 generated by flows between London and stations in the ‘Greater Southend’ area.

TABLE 12 **Greater Southend to London flow revenue**

	Total revenue (£m) 2003		*Total revenue (£m) 2004*	
	Great Eastern	*c2c*	*Great Eastern*	*c2c*
All flows between stations in the ‘Greater Southend’ area and London	(		✂	)

Source: NEG.

35. A further piece of evidence we have taken account of in deciding which flows we should investigate is the catchment area data for stations outside the M25 on the two rail lines.[11] These data show some overlap in the catchment areas, even extending, as noted above, to Shoeburyness, and a closeness in many catchment areas.

Rail vs rail overlaps in the Peterborough triangle

OFT analysis

36. The OFT stated[12] that the combination of regulation and a competitive public transport service from a major operator suggests that it is unlikely these overlaps will raise any substantial competition concerns.

Identifying significant overlaps

37. The OFT noted that the merger created 17 overlaps. In 2003, total rail ticket revenue on the overlap flows was modest (£[✂), of which slightly more than half (£[✂]) was from unregulated fares. Route changes agreed with the SRA will reduce total revenue to £[✂] million. Total revenue is broken down by flows in Table 13.

[11]Annex 6.10 of NEG’s submission reproduced on the CC’s web site.
[12]Paragraph 15 in its decision document.

TABLE 13 **Revenue for overlapping flows, 2003**

	Revenue £'000	*Passengers %*
Norwich–Wymondham†		
Norwich–Attleborough†		
Norwich–Thetford		
Norwich–Ely		
Wymondham–Attleborough†		
Wymondham–Thetford†		
Wymondham–Ely†		
Attleborough–Thetford		
Attleborough–Ely	✂	
Thetford–Ely		
Whittlesea–Ely		
Peterborough–Ely		
Cambridge–Ely*		
March–Whittlesea		
March–Peterborough		
Whittlesea–Peterborough		
Total		

Source: CC calculations on data provided by NEG.

*NEG estimate.
†Will be no overlap in 2004.

38. The largest overlapping flows are Cambridge to Ely, March to Peterborough, Norwich to Thetford, Norwich to Attleborough and Norwich to Ely.[13]

[13]Taking account of the lost overlaps in 2004, increasing the proportions of overlap revenues accounted for each of these stations to [✂] and [✂].